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Law and the New Institutional Economics: Water 
Markets and Legal Change in California, 1987–2005 
Jedidiah Brewer∗ 
Michael A. Fleishman∗∗ 
Robert Glennon∗∗∗ 
Alan Ker∗∗∗∗ 
Gary Libecap∗∗∗∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) focuses on the interaction 
between legal (formal and informal) institutions and economic 
behavior.1 Both directions of causality concern researchers in the 
field: how institutions influence economic behavior and how 
economic factors affect institutional change. As such, the NIE 
abandons standard neoclassical economics assumptions that 
individuals have perfect information about the market and important 
current or future events, as well as the assumption that transaction 
costs of exchange are zero. As a result, NIE introduces observed 
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 1. For a discussion of New Institutional Economics, see HANDBOOK OF THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., Springer 2005). 
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organization and information costs to neoclassical analysis, thereby 
providing more analytical richness and power for examining 
empirical activities. Institutions, such as written contracts, charters, 
constitutions, laws, and even unwritten norms and codes of behavior 
are devised to reduce information uncertainty and transaction costs. If 
effective, these institutions can promote efficiency by encouraging 
investment, production, and trade. 
Institutions, especially laws and regulatory arrangements, may 
also be used to redistribute income, or be part of rent-seeking 
activities. If ineffective, these institutions may result in inefficiencies 
and reduced investment, production, and trade.2 At the same time, 
individuals engage in collective action as a response to exogenous 
changes in relative prices to make institutions more effective in 
promoting economical activities.3 
In the spirit of the NIE, we examine the interactions among 
regulation, property rights, and water markets in California from 
1987–2005. We are interested in whether and how the definition of 
water rights and the regulation of water transfers have affected 
observed market activity in the extent and pattern of water trades and 
their duration, and the nature of the contracts used (short-term leases, 
long-term leases, and sales).  
There is growing pressure to re-allocate fresh water from 
historical uses in agriculture, where as much as eighty percent of 
water has been used, to meet greater water demands in urban areas, 
recreation (i.e. fishing and boating), and in the environmental (i.e. 
protect endangered species and repairing aquatic and riparian 
habitats). Fresh water supplies are limited with little or no new 
sources, so meeting new demands necessarily requires re-allocation.  
 
 2. This does not mean that all redistribution is inefficient. Some redistribution can 
provide more social and political stability for property rights and the overall economy by being 
perceived as more “fair” or “just.” For a discussion of fairness issues, see Alberto Alesina & 
George-Marios Angeletos: Fairness and Redistribution, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 960 (2005); Gary 
D. Libecap, Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights, 145 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 6–24 (1989). 
 3. Not all institutional change, of course, is aimed at efficiency. For example, some 
change is designed to facilitate rent seeking or redistribution as a resource’s value rises. For a 
discussion of the various motives for institutional change in response to price change, see GARY 
D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 16–19 (1989). 
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Markets are institutional options for achieving such re-allocation. 
Land markets, for example, fairly smoothly and routinely shift land 
resources from one use (farming) to another (housing). But water is a 
more complicated resource than land. Due to its physical mobility, 
water cannot be easily bounded or partitioned across claimants and 
uses, making it more difficult to define and enforce property 
boundaries and rights. As a result, exclusion is extremely difficult 
and numerous parties typically access the same water either 
simultaneously or sequentially. Because it is difficult to segment 
water into its various concurrent or chronological uses, there is often 
a high degree of interaction among water claimants and applicants. 
For these reasons, water trading among some parties can have 
important and negative effects on others.  
For instance, consider an upstream irrigator who diverts water for 
farming purposes. Only part of the water will be used, with the 
remainder percolating back through the ground to aquifers, streams, 
or ditches for repeated access by other parties in the same watershed 
or basin. If the first farmer were to sell some or all of her water and 
ship it out of the basin for urban use, the unconsumed residual or tail 
water would no longer be available for use by subsequent claimants 
or environmental uses. They would lose access to water and be 
harmed by the trading process.  
Accordingly, any trades that change the location of water 
diversion, nature of use, and timing, especially if they are large 
relative to the stream flow, are restricted by state law and regulated 
by state agencies. Because of the potential for harm, transfers of 
surface water rights in western states are predicated on there being 
“no harm or injury” to downstream rights holders. State water 
agencies, such as the California State Water Resources Control 
Agency, typically allow trades that involve changes in diversion and 
location only for historical consumptive uses (water that would not be 
available to subsequent users in any event) in order to minimize these 
negative third-party effects.4 In contrast, local, short-term water 
 
 4. Ronald N. Johnson et al., The Definition of a Surface Water Right and Transferability, 
24 J.L. & ECON. 273 (1981). The authors describe how specifying a property right in water in 
terms of consumptive use with options for third party grievances can be an effective method for 
promoting transfers.  
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transfers among neighboring users, such as irrigators, typically do not 
require state approval because the water stays nearby and any 
changes are of limited duration.  
California laws and regulations, as defined by the state legislature, 
courts, and administrative agencies, may promote water market 
transactions if they: (1) clarify the definition and enforcement of 
private water rights so that ownership is obvious; (2) streamline and 
make transparent the regulatory process; and (3) limit third-party 
protests to well-defined criteria and short time periods. Alternatively, 
California law may retard or change the duration and type of 
transactions if water rights are weakened and/or the regulatory 
process is made more complicated. For instance, California law could 
affect the relative costs and benefits of using particular contracts 
(leases relative to sales), and the length of transactions (short term 
versus long term or permanent) by the nature of the regulatory 
process.  
In this Article, we examine the water market activities in 
California between 1987 and 2005 and analyze how the changes in 
the definition of water rights and regulation have influenced the 
extent and nature of water trading.  
II. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR WATER TRANSFERS IN 
CALIFORNIA 
California is one of the most important states in the West with 
respect to water transfers, along with Arizona, Colorado, and Texas.5 
California not only was one of the earliest states to adopt the prior 
appropriation doctrine; it also was the first state to recognize that 
water rights could be transferred independently of land.6 In turn, 
federal and state water projects have given California large-scale 
 
 5. See Jedidiah Brewer et al., Water Markets in the West: Prices, Trading, and 
Contractual Forms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13002, 2007), for a 
discussion of water transfers by state in the west.  
 6. See Brian E. Gray, The Shape of Transfers to Come: A Model Water Transfer Act for 
California, 4 HASTINGS W-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 23 (1996); see also Duckworth v. 
Watsonville Water & Light Co., 150 Cal. 520, 530–31 (1907); CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 23, § 775 
(2005). 
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storage facilities and the infrastructure to move water from one part 
of the state to another.  
For example, the State Water Project (SWP) captures water in the 
Oroville Reservoir, located on the Feather River in Northern 
California, and exports water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta 
to areas both west and south of the delta.7 Two-thirds of the people in 
California receive some portion of their water supply from the SWP, 
including the southern San Francisco Bay area, southern California, 
and over 700,000 acres of farmland in the Tulare Lake Basin of the 
San Joaquin Valley.8 
Additionally, the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) 
operates the Central Valley Project (CVP), which is perhaps the 
nation’s largest water project. CVP stretches almost 500 miles from 
north of Sacramento down to the Kern River in the south.9 The CVP 
consists of 20 dams and reservoirs, 11 power plants, and 500 miles of 
major canals.10 Despite these immense water projects, in the 1970s an 
ever-expanding population required California to come to terms with 
the reality that it not only had one of the biggest agricultural 
economies in the world, but also a population of thirty-five million 
people.  
It was within this context that the idea of water marketing seemed 
like a sensible way of making more efficient use of existing water 
resources.11 In 1978, a specially appointed Governor’s Commission 
recommended statutory changes to create greater incentives for more 
 
 7. State Water Project, http://www.publicaffairs.water.ca.gov/swp (last visited Dec. 7, 
2007). 
 8. See Gerald E. Johns, Making Water Transfers Work in California, in 2005, A.B.A. 
SEC. OF ENV’T, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES, 23RD ANN. WATER CONF. 31, 32.  
 9. See Central Valley Project, General Overview, http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/ 
cvp.html#genreal (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). 
 10. Id.  
 11. For a recent analysis of water marketing in California, see generally Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policies and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 673 
(1993); Ellen Hanak, Counties Wresting Control: Local Responses to California’s State Wide 
Water Market, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 490 (2003); Ellen Hanak, Stopping the Drain: Third 
Party Responses to California’s Water Market (Pub. Pol’y Inst. of Cal., Working Paper No. 
2004.11 (2005); ELLEN HANAK, WHO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SELL WATER IN CALIFORNIA? 
THIRD PARTY ISSUES AND THE WATER MARKET (Public Policy Inst. of California 2003); ELLEN 
HANAK, CALIFORNIA’S WATER MARKET, BY THE NUMBERS (Pub. Pol’y Inst. of California 
2002); Kevin N. O’Brien & Robert R. Gunning, Water Marketing in California Revisited: The 
Legacy of the 1987–1992 Drought, 25 PAC. L.J. 1053 (1994). 
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efficient use of water, and to clarify water rights in order to 
encourage voluntary water transfers.12 The California Legislature 
enacted these recommendations into law in 1980.13 The Legislature 
mandated that “The growing water needs of the state require the use 
of water in an efficient manner and that the efficient use of water 
requires certainty in the definition of property rights to the use of 
water and transferability of such rights.”14  
In 1982, the Legislature directed the California Department of 
Water Resources (DWR), the State Water Resources Control Board 
(SWRCB), and other state agencies to “encourage voluntary transfers 
of water and water rights.”15 One impediment to water transfers in the 
West has been the law in some states that provides that conserved 
water go to the next junior in the priority system rather than to the 
person who undertook the conservation effort for either additional 
irrigation or for sale or lease to a third party.16 To try to eliminate this 
disincentive for conservation, the California Legislature enacted a 
series of laws that allowed the transfer of conserved and surplus 
water to be consistent with beneficial use.17  
 
 12. See Gray, supra note 6. 
 13. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 109(b), 475, 1010, 1011, 1244 (West 1971 & Supp. 2007); 
see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, ch. 3 (2007). All the administrative regulations noted 
throughout the matrix are covered by California Code of Regulations, which outlines many of 
the procedures of the State Water Resources Control Board. The Board’s authority is derived 
from CAL. WATER CODE § 1058 (West 1971 & Supp. 2007).  
 14. Id. § 109(a). 
 15. Id. § 109(b). 
 16. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, 529 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1974). 
 17. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 380–87, 1010–11, 1240, 1244; cf. City of Los Angeles v. City 
of Glendale, 142 P.2d 289 (1943) (holding that although the city has a prior right to use water 
brought into a city, it has no basis of objecting to any use of water that does not decrease the 
city’s supply); see also Lindblom v. Round Val. Water Co., 173 P. 994 (1918) (discussing 
difference between abandonment and forfeiture). These code sections are important in 
understanding the seemingly conflicting provisions of the California Constitution and the Water 
Code. The natural question of how can surplus water be transferred, yet also be protected from 
forfeiture or waste is still debatable. Sections 1010–11 provide for the sale, lease, exchange, or 
transfer of reclaimed water, polluted water, and conserved water, but by themselves provide no 
protection against claims of waste or forfeiture. Section 1244 specifically states that “[t]he sale, 
lease, exchange, or transfer of water or water rights, in itself, shall not constitute evidence of 
waste or unreasonable use. . . .” Professor Brian Gray has argued that there is still sufficient 
uncertainty in this area, which has prevented wider participation in the water market. See Gray, 
supra note 6, at 30. 
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In 1982, in an attempt to decentralize the water transfer process, 
the California Legislature recognized that “[m]any water 
management decisions can best be made at a local level . . . [where] 
flexibility will maximize efficient state wide use of water supplies.”18 
The Legislature allowed local water agencies to sell water outside 
their boundaries, serve as water brokers, and control the transfer of 
surplus water.19 These provisions greatly enhanced the authority of 
irrigation districts and other water providers to control the transfer of 
water outside their boundaries. Notwithstanding this authority 
delegated to local agencies, all transfers in California are still subject 
to the overarching no-injury provision of the water code.20 The 
Legislature also created rules that govern water transfers that 
distinguish between short-term and long-term transfers. It created 
three categories of short-term transfers: (1) temporary urgency 
changes,21 which apply during droughts and emergencies; (2) 
temporary changes,22 which occur for up to a year; and (3) trial 
 
 18. CAL. WATER CODE § 380(c) (West 1971 & Supp. 2007).  
 19. Id. § 382–83. Section 383 gives the local water agency a great deal of power over its 
local members’ ability to transfer water. The consent of the agency is required before an 
individual will be able to transfer her water rights.  
 20. Id. § 386. California also distinguishes surface water rights by whether they were 
commenced before or after 1914. If after 1914, the water users must obtain a permit from the 
SWRC. The pre-1914 rights are not subject to a permitting process. Even though the initial 
appropriation of these early rights is not subject to SWRCB oversight, the transfers of such 
rights are still subject to the no-injury rules.  
 21. Id. § 1435. Section 1435 provides that a permittee or licensee that has “an urgent need 
to change a point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use . . . may petition for . . . a 
conditional, temporary change order without complying with other procedures or provisions 
. . .”. A temporary urgency change may last for no more than 180 days, but may be renewed by 
the Board. The Board has oversight of these petitions and approval of a temporary urgency 
change does not create a vesting of water rights.  
 22. Id. §§ 1725–32. Section 1728 defines a temporary change as “any change of point of 
diversion, place of use, or purpose of use involving a transfer or exchange of water or water 
rights for a period of one year or less.” Section 1725 restricts the transfer of water to that which 
the transferor would have “consumptively used or stored” prior to the transfer. The 1988 
amendments to section 1726 remove a provision that previously allowed a transferor to simply 
notify the Board that it was planning a temporary change. The Board must now be notified and 
has oversight power as well. Temporary changes may still be seen as beneficial to the transferor 
because of the potential allowance for expedited approval by the Board (see Matrix Factor 60, 
which was given a “1,” because of the expedited system for water leases and temporary 
changes). The burden is on the transferor to show that the proposed transfer will meet the 
traditional no-injury rule.  
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transfers,23 which allow for experimental transfers.24 Long-term 
transfers occur when the period exceeds one year.25  
In 1986, the Legislature further clarified the voluntary 
conservation of water; allowing the transfer of conserved and surplus 
water. It also allows for the transfer of non-surplus water made 
available by land fallowing.26 The Legislature also put water rights on 
a more secure basis by recognizing that water transfers are beneficial 
uses and are not subject to the forfeiture rules.27 Because California 
has the riparian rights doctrine in addition to the prior appropriation 
rule, the question arose as to whether riparian rights could be 
transferred. The California Legislature attempted to resolve this issue 
in 1988 by providing that decreed riparian rights may be 
transferred.28  
In 1991, the California Legislature took a significant step when it 
created the Emergency Drought Water Bank.29 The Bank served to 
alleviate many drought related problems at the time by allowing for 
the prompt but temporary transfer of water from one user to 
another.30 The agricultural community bought into the water bank 
idea because their rights were protected, the program involved only 
short-term transfers, and there were substantial financial rewards to 
those who participated.31 The water bank was particularly active 
during a five-year drought cycle in the late 1980s and early 1990s.32 
It can be seen as a necessary catalyst for a sustainable long-term 
market, in part because the bank was so successful as revealed in the 
transfer data described below. In 1991 it acquired 820,665 acre-feet 
of water.33 The major purchasers were the Metropolitan Water 
 
 23. 1980 Cal. Stat. 2956–58. 
 24. See id. at 3676. 
 25. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1735–1737 (West 1971 & Supp. 2007). 
 26. See id. §§ 382, 475, 480, 1011, 1745.02, 1745.05. 
 27. See id. §§ 1024(C), 1244, 1745.05. 
 28. See id. § 1740.  
 29. David J. Guy, A Model Water Transfer Act for California: An Agricultural 
Perspective, 4 HASTINGS W.–N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 75, 77 (1996). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. Water rights holders were paid $125 per acre-foot in 1991 and $50 per acre-foot in 
1992. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, Recent California Water Transfers: Implications for 
Water Management, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 7 (1995). 
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District of Southern California, the Kern County Water Agency, and 
the San Francisco Water District.34 Notably, as we show below, most 
of the water moved from agricultural to municipal and industrial 
uses. In 1992, the water bank remained active, though with a smaller 
number of participants and less water. The primary purchasers that 
year were farmers, as there was sufficient rainfall for industrial and 
domestic uses.35  
Also in 1992, the California legislature allowed water providers to 
transfer conserved water by members of water agencies.36 In 1999, 
the legislature further refined the water transfer process and more 
securely established property rights through the Water Rights 
Protection and Expedited Short-Term Water Transfer Act, which 
provided that a transfer or an offer to transfer water would not be a 
basis for forfeiture, abandonment, or modification of the water 
right.37 This Act helped allay the fears of many water rights holders 
who had not entered the market for fear of losing their water rights.38 
The Act also protected rights holders from the actions of a transferee. 
If a transferee should violate any of the numerous reasonable use 
provisions in the Water Code, the Act provides for an automatic 
reversion of the water rights back to the transferor.39 The Act sped up 
the transfer review proceedings by providing that the board must 
reach a decision within forty-five days.40  
The 1999 Act also attempted to confront third-party issues that 
arise from water transfers. Prior to the Act, agricultural water rights 
holders could fallow or retire farmland and then transfer the water at 
will.41 But the Act distinguishes between temporary land fallowing 
 
 34. Id. at 11.  
 35. Id. at 15. 
 36. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1745–45.11.  
 37. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1014 (West 1971 & Supp. 2007); see also Wood v. Etiwanda 
Co., 81 P. 512, 514 (Cal. 1905) (holding that stopping use of a water right was not a basis of 
abandonment of the right). 
 38. See Guy, supra note 31, at 77. Many of the provisions of the 1999 Act incorporated 
many of the concerns raised by Guy in the above piece. Securing water rights has long been a 
major concern of agriculturalists. The ability to participate in short-term transfers that will not 
jeopardize water rights, it is argued, should bring a number of new rights-holders to the market.  
 39. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1015 (West 1971 & Supp. 2007).  
 40. Id. § 1726(e), (g)(1)–(2).  
 41. See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 408, § 1, at 96 (West) (amending CAL. WATER CODE 
§ 1011(b)). 
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and permanent land fallowing.42 Now, only water conserved from 
temporary fallowing may be transferred.  
In California, most water users do not hold the water rights; 
instead, they have water contracts with supply agencies such as the 
State Water Project or the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.43 The 
complicated nature of water rights in California has meant that there 
is no single entity with jurisdiction to oversee the process. The 
SWRCB has general authority over surface water rights in California 
but, because much of California’s water is regulated under contract 
either with the Bureau of Reclamation or with the Department of 
Water Resources through the State Water Project, many transfers 
escape the scrutiny of SWRCB. Indeed most transfers in California 
have been within the Central Valley Project or the State Water 
Project. Between 1981 and 1989, some 1200 informal transfers took 
place just within the CVP.44 
The relationship between irrigation districts and their members 
also complicates the water transfer process in California.45 Because 
most surface water used in California comes from either the Central 
Valley Project, administered by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, or 
the State Water Project, administered by the Department of Water 
Resources, there are contractual rights between the state or federal 
agency and institutions, such as an irrigation district or a conservancy 
district. Even though an irrigation district typically has a contract 
with the state or federal agency, its property right is generally 
considered to be minimal.46 At the same time, the ability of the actual 
water users to dispose of “their” water is severely restricted. First, 
there may be conditions imposed by USBR or DWR in the contract 
with the irrigation district. Second, the nature of the property right 
 
 42. Id. §§ 1732, 1745.10, 1745.11. 
 43. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1745–1745.11 (West 1971 & Supp. 2007); Gray, supra 
note 6, at 774. 
 44. See Barton H. Thompson, Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 
CAL. L. REV. 673, 719 (1993). 
 45. See Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 249, 
278–80, 290–91 (1994) [hereinafter Gray, Modern Era]; Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? 
Private Rights and Public Authority Over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 363 
(1997).  
 46. See Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. Sec’y of the Dept. of Interior, 742 F.2d 527, 
530–31 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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held by the ultimate water user is quite ambiguous, ultimately turning 
on the relationship between the district and the water users.47 Third, 
state law may place additional restrictions on transfers outside of 
irrigation districts or even within the district itself.48 Fourth, the 
internal regulations of various irrigation districts may demand that 
the proposed transfer receive the approval of the board of directors of 
the district.49 
Even though the California Water Code allows an irrigation 
district, if it determines that entering into a contract for the sale or 
lease of any surplus water50 is in the best interest of the district, it is 
unclear whether individual water users in the district have a right to 
transfer even water that they have “conserved.”51 This uncertainty of 
water rights and individual user authority is a substantial constraint in 
water transfers.52 
In 1992, Congress passed the Central Valley Project Improvement 
Act (CVPIA), which reallocates Central Valley Project water directly 
to the environment.53 CVPIA allocates 800,000 acre-feet to meeting 
the needs of fish and wildlife in the Sacramento River and the 
Sacramento/San Joaquin River delta.54 The CVPIA also allocates 
another 400,000 acre-feet for wildlife reserves in the Central 
Valley.55 The CVPIA uses water transfers to generate the water for 
these environmental objectives. The CVPIA basically allows existing 
contractors to benefit from selling heavily subsidized USBR water at 
contemporary market rates.56 The Secretary of the Interior must 
 
 47. See Richard Roos-Collins, Voluntary Conveyance of the Right to Receive a Water 
Supply from the United States Bureau of Reclamation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 773, 847 (1987).  
 48. See Gray, Modern Era, supra note 45, at 279–80.  
 49. See, e.g., Westlands Water District, Regulations—Article 2, http://www.westlands 
water.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2007); see also Gray, Modern Era, supra note 45, at 280.  
 50. CAL. WATER CODE § 22259 (West 1971 & Supp. 2007). 
 51. CAL. WATER CODE § 1011(a) (West 1971 & Supp. 2007).  
 52. Paul R. Williams & Steven J. McHugh, Water Marketing and Instream Flows, 9 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 132 (1990).  
 53. Central Valley Project, Overview-History, http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/ 
cupintro.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2007). 
 54. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES, 778 (4th ed. 2006). 
For additional information about CVPIA, see Harrison Dunning, Confronting the 
Environmental Legacy of Irrigated Agriculture in the West: The Case of the Central Valley 
Project, 23 ENVTL. L. 943 (1993). 
 55. See SAX ET AL., supra note 54, at 778. 
 56. Id.  
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approve all transfers in order to protect the area of origin and to 
ensure that fish and wildlife habitat are protected.57 But, in a sharp 
departure from conventional practice, CVPIA authorizes individual 
farmers, rather than irrigation districts, to engage in water transfers.58 
If individual farmers propose to transfer less than twenty percent of 
the CVPIA water received by the district, the district cannot prohibit 
the transfers.59  
Another environmental program is the Calfed Environmental 
Water Account (EWA), which is a collaboration between federal and 
state agencies to provide protection to at-risk fish species in the 
Bay/Delta system.60 Begun in 2001, the EWA program typically 
purchases in excess of 200,000 acre-feet of water each year, and uses 
this water to protect at-risk fish species in the Bay/Delta system.61 
Judicial decisions have also played a major role in affecting the 
incentives for water transfers in California. For example, in Imperial 
Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control Board62 the 
court held that the state retained the power “to prescribe water use 
practices, to limit waste, and to sanction water transfers.” This ruling 
created tremendous incentive for the Imperial Irrigation District to 
modernize its infrastructure to avoid forfeiture of some of its water 
rights.  
Administrative rulings by the SWRCB may impact water transfers 
under application of the discretionary “public interest” criteria.63 The 
SWRCB has authority to deny outright any application on “public 
interest” grounds or to approve the transfer subject to various terms 
and conditions that the board sees fit to employ. The process can be 
unpredictable and time consuming.64 The legislature embellished the 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 778. 
 60. See generally Welcome to CALFED Bay-Delta Program, http://calwater.ca.gov/ 
calfed/about/about_calfed.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2007). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 573 
(1990) (citing Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 1529, 1546–47 (1989)).  
 63. See Gray, supra note 6; see also McDonald & Blackburn v. Bear River & Auburn 
Water & Mining Co., 13 Cal. 220, 233 (Cal. 1859) (stating that “the ownership of water, as a 
substantive and valuable property right . . . may be transferred like other property.”). 
 64. See generally Consuelo Bokum, Implementing the Public Welfare Requirement in 
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common law prohibitions on the no-injury rule to include protection 
for fish, wildlife, and other instream beneficial uses, as well as 
protection for third parties from unreasonable harm caused by water 
transfers.65 The SWRCB often has used these provisions to justify 
additional terms and conditions to water transfer permits in order to 
protect instream stream flows and other instream uses.66 
III. DATA ON WATER TRANSFERS IN CALIFORNIA 
To analyze the interaction between water markets and the law, we 
collected data on California water transfers from the major water 
trading journal, the monthly publication Water Strategist, from 1987-
2005, the period for which such data are available.67 In Brewer, 
Glennon, Ker and Libecap we describe the data collection 
methodology in detail so only a brief summary is provided here.68 
The Water Strategist is self-advertised as “the only source of 
published information on water transactions in the West.”69 Each 
month, the journal publishes a “Transactions” section that lists, by 
state, each water transfer that occurred.70 It typically lists: the year of 
the transfer; the acquirer of the water; the supplier; the amount of 
water transferred; the proposed use of the water; the price; and the 
type of contract.71 Uses of water include agriculture, urban 
(municipal & industrial), and environmental.72 Accordingly, there are 
nine possible trades: agriculture to agriculture, agriculture to urban, 
agriculture to environmental, urban to agriculture, urban to urban, 
urban to environmental, environmental to agriculture, environmental 
 
New Mexico’s Water Code, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 681, 706 (1996). Bokum notes that fourteen 
of eighteen western states have adopted public welfare/interest lists of uses. Six of the fourteen 
states explicitly list uses in their statutes, including California.  
 65. See Gray, supra note 6; see also CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1702, 1706, 1028, 1435(b), 
1725, 1736, 1745.10, 1745.11 (West 1971 & Supp. 2007). 
 66. See Gray, supra note 6.  
 67. Water Strategist, http://www.waterstrategist.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2007). 
 68. See Brewer et al., supra note 5; Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American 
West: 1987–2005, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1021, 1034–37 (2007) [hereinafter Transferring 
Water in the American West]. 
 69. Water Strategist, supra note 67, at homepage. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Transferring Water in the American West, supra note 68, at 1035. 
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to urban, and environmental to environmental.73 This data is one of 
the bases for our analysis of water transactions. 
This section provides a brief discussion of the trends in the 
California water market. On the whole, California has an active water 
market compared to other states in the West and thus is an important 
market to analyze. This is true for both the number of transfers that 
have taken place and the amount of water that has been traded. Over 
the 19 year period (1987–2005) in our sample, 493 transfers took 
place in California, which transferred over 11.3 million acre-feet of 
water.74 In comparison, in ten of the other eleven states in the West75 
(excluding Colorado76) there were 1047 water transfers totaling about 
19.1 million acre-feet.77 These numbers indicate that California 
accounts for almost half of the number of transfers and sixty-percent 
of the amount of water transferred in the West. Therefore, 
understanding how the legal process affects water markets in 
California is an important first step to understanding how the legal 
process may affect water markets more generally in the West.  
A. Total California Water Transfers 
Figure 1 illustrates water trading in California over the nineteen-
year period. The left axis represents the volume of water transferred 
as measured by annual flow whereas the right axis represents the 
number of transfers. We graphed them together to show how the two 
data series correspond to each other. The correlation coefficient 
between the number and volume of transfers is 0.76 indicating the 
two series tend to move together.  
 
 73. Id. at 1035 n.86. 
 74. See infra Figure 1. An acre foot of water is 325,851gallons. 
 75. In addition to California our dataset includes water transfer information from eleven 
other states in the West: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, 
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Brewer et al., supra note 5, at 15. 
 76. Colorado has a unique water market system where numerous small transfers occur 
each year. Over the sample period there were 1,777 transfers in the state with a total of 
1,265,560 acre-feet transferred. Thus, each transfer is an average of approximately 700 acre-
feet. California’s transfers were less in number (493), but much larger (23,000 acre-feet on 
average), for a total amount of 11,395,892 acre-feet transferred—almost ten times what was 
transferred in Colorado. 
 77. See generally Transferring Water in the American West, supra note 68, at 1035–49. 
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As shown, there is no clear trend in the number of water transfers. 
The greatest activity occurred in California in 1991 and the least in 
1996. The data reveals a general increase in the amount traded, with 
the greatest amounts involved in 1991 and 2003 and the least in 1996.  
 
FIGURE 1 
 
In our empirical analysis in Section V, we model both the volume 
and number of transfers because while related, they represent 
different metrics of market activity. For example, if the transaction 
costs for a transfer are primarily fixed, that is that the costs are 
similar whether 100 or 10,000 acre-feet are being transferred, the 
volume of water exchanged would be a poor metric for identifying 
factors that promote or hinder market activity. In that situation, 
modeling the number of transfers rather than the volume of transfers 
would better identify which factors promote or hinder market 
activity. If, on the other hand, the transaction costs for a transfer are 
primarily variable, that is that the costs increase with the volume of 
water transferred, then the volume rather than the number of transfers 
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would be the appropriate metric to identify which factors promote or 
hinder market activity. With respect to water transfers in California, 
transaction costs are comprised of both fixed and variable costs, so 
we have modeled both. 
B. California Water Market Contracts 
Figure 2 describes the contract type used in California water 
markets. The data in the figure demonstrates the dominance of short 
term (one-year) leases in California. As figure 2 shows, there is no 
clear trend in either short or long term leasing, but sales of water 
rights are increasing. The predominate use of short term sales in 
California is of special note in comparison with other states in the 
West. In total, 62% (305 out of 493) of all transfers in California 
were short term leases for one year or less. This sharply contrasts to 
the rest of the West where only 39% of all transfers (excluding 
Colorado) were short term leases.78  
FIGURE 2 
 
 
 78. Including Colorado only magnifies the difference. If Colorado is included only 
seventeen percent of all transfers were short-term leases in the rest of the West. 
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C. Water Market Transaction Types 
Figure 3 outlines the number of transactions by major categories 
of trading in California: agriculture-to-agriculture, agriculture-to-
urban, and agriculture-to-environmental. As shown, there was a spike 
in agriculture-to-agriculture and agriculture-to-urban trading in 1991. 
There is a slight declining trend in agriculture-to-agriculture trades; 
no clear trend in agriculture-to-urban; and a slight increase in 
agriculture-to-environmental trades over the nineteen-year period.  
FIGURE 3 
 
D. Quantities Traded 
Figure 4 examines quantities traded for the same categories. The 
quantity patterns tend to mirror those shown in Figure 4, with spikes 
for agriculture-to-agriculture and agriculture-to-urban trades in the 
early 1990s and increases in agriculture-to-environmental trades by 
2003. Moreover, slight increases also were seen in amounts traded 
from agriculture-to-urban.  
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FIGURE 4 
Quantities Traded by Category
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Table 1 illustrates trades within California, and compares market 
activities within the state with other states in the West in terms of the 
number of transfers and the amount of water exchanged. The table 
shows that California is fairly balanced between agriculture-to-
agriculture, agriculture-to-urban, and agriculture-to-environmental 
transfers. “Agriculture to Agriculture” trades account for twenty-two 
percent of the number of water transfers, but only fourteen percent of 
the total volume of transfers. Agriculture-to-urban transactions reveal 
a similar pattern, but agriculture-to-environmental transfers are larger 
on average, involving fifteen percent of the trades, but twenty-four 
percent of the volume.  
Most notably, the table displays key comparisons with other 
states. For one, California tends to engage in more agriculture-to-
agriculture transfers than most other states, but the average size of 
each exchange is smaller. The opposite is true for agriculture-to-
urban transfers. California engages in relatively fewer agriculture-to-
urban transfers (as a percent of total transfers), but moves more water 
from agriculture to urban uses. This means that agriculture-to-urban 
transfers in California are generally larger than elsewhere. 
Additionally, agriculture-to-environmental transfers are more 
important in California than in other western states.  
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TABLE 1  
Percent of Transfers (Number) 
  Ag-to-Ag Ag-to-Urban Ag-to-Envir Other Total 
California 22% 22% 15% 42% 100% 
Other Western 
States 13% 61% 6% 21% 100% 
Other Western 
States (Excluding 
Colorado) 17% 37% 13% 33% 100% 
Percent of Water Transferred (Acre-feet) 
  Ag-to-Ag Ag-to-Urban Ag-to-Envir Other Total 
California 14% 18% 24% 43% 100% 
Other Western 
States 27% 17% 16% 40% 100% 
Other Western 
States (Excluding 
Colorado) 28% 16% 16% 40% 100% 
 
In sum, the data in the above figures and table reveal a steady 
number of trades, and an increase in amounts involved over nineteen 
years in California. Within those aggregates, agriculture-to-urban and 
environmental transactions are increasing, and the importance of 
water sales is rising relative to short term and long term leases, even 
though short term leasing remains the dominant type of transaction. 
California differs distinctly from other states in the West as it relies 
more heavily on short term transactions. California also transfers less 
water within agriculture and more water out of agriculture (relative to 
all water transferred within the state) than other western states. The 
issues to be explored throughout the rest of the Article include: (a) 
the nature of water transactions in California; (b) the patterns of legal 
change involving statutes, court rulings, and administrative agency 
decisions; and (c) the role of changes in legal property rights and 
regulatory systems in California for explaining changes in the annual 
number of water transfers and amounts transacted in the state, when 
controlling for other factors.  
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IV. DATA ON LEGAL CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA 
A. Methodology 
The manner in which the law defines water rights and the 
operation of the regulatory process can importantly affect water 
transfers. In order to more precisely examine the impact of legal 
changes on water marketing, we coded water law in California 
between 1980 and 2005 with respect to twenty-one legal variables 
that might encourage or retard the transfer of water from agriculture 
to municipal and environmental uses. We partitioned the twenty-one 
legal variables into those that strengthened water rights and promoted 
water transfers, and those that weakened water rights and limited or 
raised the transaction costs of water trades. The breakdown of 
variables is provided below in Table 2.  
TABLE 2 
LEGAL FACTORS 
Factors that Strengthened Property Rights and 
Lowered the Transaction Costs of Trading 
Factor 
Number* 
- Does the law make water right more definite or precise? 1 
– Does the law specifically define what uses qualify as 
beneficial uses?  
2 
– Does the law allow for the sale of the land without the 
water right or the water right without the land?  
3 
– Does the law allow someone to profit from the sale, 
transfer, or exchange of his water right to another?  
4 
– Does the law allow someone to transfer ownership of 
his water right?  
5 
– Does the law allow someone to lease his water right to 
someone else?  
6 
– Does the law allow temporary transfer of water rights 
on an emergency basis, in times of need?  
7 
– Does the law allow someone to exchange his water 
right?  
8 
– Does the law add a mechanism for enforcing water 
rights?  
9 
– Does the law require or encourage water conservation?  10 
– Does the law encourage water conservation and then 11 
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Factors that Strengthened Property Rights and 
Lowered the Transaction Costs of Trading 
Factor 
Number* 
allow the owner of the right to sell or transfer some or all 
of that conserved water? 
– Does the law provide for water banking mechanisms?  12 
– Does the law provide an expedited process for short 
term transfers or transfer of water rights during times of 
great need, like droughts?  
13 
– Does the law allow the use of canals, reservoirs, water 
support facilities, or streambeds to transport water as part 
of a water transfer?  
14 
Factors that Weaken Property Rights and Raise the 
Transaction Costs of Trading 
 
– Does the law authorize water districts, irrigation 
districts, or other member institutions to regulate use and 
transfer of water by their members?  
15 
– Does the law limit water use based on environmental 
concerns or restrictions?  
16 
– Does the law limit the transfer of water rights to protect 
the rights of other water users?  
17 
– Does the law restrict the transfer of water rights to 
protect the environment?  
18 
– Does the law require a third party to be compensated for 
damage to his water right or when he sells or transfers his 
water right?  
19 
– Does the law provide for or require notice of proposed 
water transfers?  
20 
– Are third parties allowed to protest water transfers, and 
what is the mechanism for those protests?  
21 
* These factor numbers were assigned by the authors as described in the text 
to identify the changes in the law illustrated in Figures 6 and 7 that either 
strengthened or weakened property rights to water. 
We analyzed each state’s law across the twenty-one water rights 
variables with respect to three types of legal rules: judicial case law, 
legislative or statutory law, and administrative regulations. The 
research involved examining all statutes and cases using Westlaw and 
Lexis Nexis legal databases and search engines, using keywords and 
tables of content for each state’s statutes. We accessed administrative 
regulations separately through legal databases for each state. 
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Treatises, law review articles, and other periodicals also guided the 
analysis.79 The analysis began with 1980 in order to have a full 
understanding of the process of legal change, even though our 
statistical analysis begins in 1987, due to data limitations.  
The coding proceeded in two stages. The first stage recorded if 
any one of the twenty-one factors was present in a state in the year 
1980. The presence of the factor would result in that factor being 
coded “1”, and the absence would result in the factor being coded 
“0.” We coded a variable as a “1” if it involved a “significant” 
change in the law, that is, a substantive or procedural change in the 
law that had a marked alteration in how the law operated. For 
example, considering the factor whether the law makes the water 
right more definite or precise, a change in law that shifted a state’s 
groundwater law from the reasonable use doctrine to an allocation of 
three acre-feet per-acre per-year was coded as a “1”, while a change 
that renamed the state’s water agency from the Department of Water 
Resources to the Department of Ecology was coded as a “0”. In other 
words, purely formal or stylistic changes were coded “0”, but 
significant substantive or procedural changes were coded as “1.”80 
Court decisions often refer to a statute or an earlier judicial precedent, 
but merely referring to a precedent may not change the law. Cases or 
statutes referred to in this way are known to lawyers as “dicta” that is, 
a discussion that is not germane to the holding of a case. We codified 
dicta as “0.” Finally, students researched administrative regulations in 
each state. 
In a year when a particular legal variable was significantly 
changed, a “1” was assigned and it remained in subsequent years. 
 
 79. Research was undertaken by a team of eight law students, with a senior law student 
supervisor and Robert Glennon as the ultimate supervisor and arbiter.  
 80. The first step in the coding process required the law students to examine the entire 
statutory code of each state. Depending on the state and the complexities of its water code, this 
task may have entailed reading several hundred statutes. This process was necessary in order to 
establish a base line for the year 1980. After that, web-based research engines became very 
helpful and efficient because, once a statute was identified, the annotations would lead the 
researcher to the associated case law. The primary technique used to identify case law was to 
search using either a known statute or key words that related to each of the factors being 
researched. Even then, the inexact functionality of search engines sometimes required the law 
students to read through many cases in order to determine whether the holding of the case 
actually changed or supplemented the law in any way. 
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Significant changes in the same law during another year would also 
be coded a “1” and thereafter.81 Given the number of legal variables 
across the three categories, many are perfectly correlated. In our 
empirical analysis we cannot differentiate between those variables in 
terms of their impact on water transfers, as discussed below. 
However, the summary of changes in the legal environment in 
California provides insights for explaining the results of the statistical 
analysis.  
B. Trends in Legal Change in California 
Figure 5 plots legal change across time in California with respect 
to the twenty-one legal variables divided into those that promoted 
water transfer relative to those that restricted water transfers. As 
indicated, the greatest activity for legal change to support water 
markets were in the years 1987, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1999, and 2003, 
whereas changes that limited water markets occurred in 1988, 1999, 
and 2001. Most changes occurred through legislation and those that 
promoted trading tended to cluster during the time periods described 
above. 
 
 81. For the coding to be meaningful, it was imperative that the law students be consistent 
in determining whether a factor was present or not. This was not a particularly challenging task 
for the factors that were precise and concrete, but more difficult when the factors were phrased 
in general terms. If the case law made the water rights more complicated or nuanced, the water 
right would not substantively be more definite or precise. Law students only coded a case as 
making a right more definite or precise if the holding of the decision in fact did so. The 
statutory and administrative coding presented some of the same challenges but it was not as 
difficult a process for two reasons. First, state statutes and administrative regulations typically 
address one specific area of law or policy. It generally is clear what a statute or administrative 
regulation is attempting to achieve. To the extent that any ambiguity remained after the student 
had read the statute, there was often legislative history that was helpful in determining a 
statute’s meaning. To resolve ambiguous issues, the team of law students worked closely 
together with the supervising senior student and the law professor to resolve how to handle 
ambiguities. As a final check on objectivity, all of the states were coded separately by at least 
two law students, and a final review was performed by a third law student. 
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FIGURE 5 
 
Figures 6 and 7 break out the pattern of change by variable. The 
most active factors in support of markets were making the water right 
more precise such as defining beneficial use to include trading 
activities, allowing for the transfer of water rights, separating water 
from the land for trading, and defining conservation and the trading 
of conserved water. The most active factors limiting water markets 
were restrictions on transfers to protect other water users, restrictions 
to protect the environment, requiring third-party compensation, 
requiring notice of transfers, and allowing for third-parties to protest 
and challenge proposed transfers. In the following section we 
statistically analyze how these legal changes may have affected 
observed water transfers by identifying when they took place and 
thereby changed the legal environment in which water transactions 
took place. 
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FIGURE 6 
 
FIGURE 7 
 
Changes in Legal Variables that Promote Transfers
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Factor Number (Table 2)
Nu
m
be
r o
f C
ha
ng
es
Changes in Legal Variables that Limit Trading
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Factor Number (Table 2)
Nu
m
be
r o
f C
ha
ng
es
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 183 Brewer et al book pages.doc  7/29/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
208 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 26:183 
 
 
V. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we empirically model the water transfer process—
both the annual number and volume of transfers—as a function of 
economic and legal institutional variables. As discussed in the 
previous section, we reviewed the legal institutions that govern water 
transfers in the California. This appraisal resulted in a number of 
legal variables that were perfectly collinear in that they changed in 
the same year. For example, with respect to legislative or statutory 
law, there were changes in 1988 in the following three factors: 
whether the law allows an individual to lease his water right to 
another; whether the law allows temporary transfer of water rights on 
an emergency basis or in times of need; and whether the law restricts 
the transfer of water rights to protect the environment. As a result, the 
three dummy variables representing these three factors were identical 
because they had the value of ‘0’ in 1987 and a ‘1’ thereafter and thus 
were empirically indistinguishable from each other. There were many 
instances of this result. Accordingly, we were forced to undertake the 
modeling process using yearly dummy variables rather than 
institutional-specific dummy variables.  
Once the yearly dummies change from a zero to a one, they 
remain a one, representing a permanent change in the legal 
institutional environment. Specifically, dummy variable 1991 is a 
zero from 1987–1990 and a one from 1991–2005 and by necessity, 
encapsulates the effect of the institutional (legal) variables that 
changed significantly in 1990 and 1991. We include both 1990 and 
1991 because legislation passed in the latter part of 1990 may only 
begin affecting water transfers in 1991. Similarly, legislation passed 
in the early part of 1991 that could have affected water transfers in 
the same year.  
In addition to the institutional variables, a number of economic 
variables representing supply and demand factors likely influencing 
water transfers were also included as control variables. These 
included precipitation measures, drought indexes, electricity rates 
(water pumping and transport costs), gross state product (economic 
activity and growth), annual state population measures, per capita 
income, percent in poverty, agricultural gross state product measures 
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(agricultural water supply), lands in farms, planted acres, harvested 
acres, farm cash receipts, and government agricultural payments. 
Table 3 below summarizes our statistical analysis of the yearly 
number of water transfers in California from 1987 to 2005 using the 
annual legal change dummies and control variables. Because the 
dependent variable is a count, the number of water transfers, we use a 
Poisson model and likelihood methods rather than ordinary least 
squares (OLS). The Poisson distribution is generally used to model 
numerical data of this form and is defined as !y/)e()yY(Pr yλ=λ= λ− . 
Hence the corresponding log likelihood function for the regression 
model is  
∑ μ−μ=β })log(y{)(LLog iii  
.X)log(where ii β=μ  
The dependent variable was the number of water transfers, the 
independent variables were the annual dummies representing legal 
change, and the controlled variable was the supply and demand for 
water transfer. We report only the coefficients that were statistically 
significant. 
TABLE 3 
DETERMINANTS OF THE NUMBER OF WATER TRANSFERS 
Variable Estimate Standard Chi-Square p-value
    Error   
          
Intercept 1.5156 0.4337 12.21 0.0005
Lagged Population Change 0.1821 0.0389 21.94 0.0001
Precipitation -0.0277 0.0104 7.16 0.0075
Dummy 1989 0.8372 0.2693 9.66 0.0019
Dummy 1991 0.8436 0.1822 21.44 0.0001
Dummy 2000 -0.2911 0.1303 4.99 0.0254
Dummy 2003 0.2335 0.1598 2.14 0.1438
 
The statistical analysis is quite revealing. On the demand side, we 
find that among the control variables, increases in California’s 
population (lagged to control for potential endogeneity) resulted in an 
increased number of water transfers, all else being equal. This is as 
predicted. On the supply side, we find that decreases in precipitation 
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led to an increased number of water transfers.82 This result is also 
consistent with predicted effects. In terms of institutional effects, we 
find the dummy variables associated with legal changes 1989, 1991, 
and 2000 had a significant impact on the number of water transfers. 
We include the dummy for 2003 to be consistent with the regression 
for the volume of water transferred. The dummy for 1989 reflects the 
effects of 1988 legislation providing that decreed riparian rights may 
be transferred, and as such, it had a positive effect on the number of 
water transfers once the law was operational. The dummy for 1991 
reflects two things. First, it reflects the important effect of the 
creation of the Emergency Drought Water Bank by the state 
legislature in 1991, which promoted short term exchanges from 
agriculture to urban uses. Second, the likely effects of 1992 changes 
in legislation that allowed water providers to transfer water conserved 
by their members. Also in 1992, the Federal Central Valley Project 
Improvement Act was enacted and smoothed the process for the 
transfer of water provided by the Bureau of Reclamation, a major 
water supply institution in California, by individual farmers. The 
discussion in Section II provides more detail as to why these 
institutional changes should have a positive effect on the number of 
water transfers in California. Finally, we find that the dummy for 
2000 is both significant and negative. In 2000 and 2001 there were 
judicial rulings that limited water transactions if there were potential 
environmental damages, and in 2001, the California Legislature 
approved statutes that required increased third-party notice of 
 
 82. Precipitation data was provided on an annualized basis from Michael Anderson, State 
Climatologist, California Department of Water Resources Division of Flood Management. We 
also collected other climate related supply variables. One was the Sacramento River 40-30-30 
Index (SIR) from the California Department of Water Resources. It measures the amount of 
water-year flow in the Sacramento River. We used the precipitation data as opposed to the SIR 
for two primary reasons. First, the SIR is calculated as a weighted-moving-average of the 
current year’s water flow and the past year’s water flow. However, the current year’s water 
flow is based on a water-year (October–September), while our water transfer data predictions 
are based on a calendar-year (January–December). Both the weighted-moving average and the 
water-year aspect of the SIR make it a more difficult variable to predict water transfers. 
Secondly, the SIR measures the water flow only in the Sacramento River. In our data set, water 
transfers occur throughout the state of California and we needed a more comprehensive 
measure. A second climate related supply variable that we collected was the Palmer Drought 
Severity Index (PDSI) for the state of California. The drought measure did not perform as well 
in predicting water transfers as did the precipitation variable. 
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proposed transfers and facilitated third-party protests of such actions. 
All else being equal, these legal changes appear to have reduced the 
number of transfers.  
We also empirically modeled the quantity of water transferred as 
measured by annual flow. Specifically, we estimate the linear model: 
β=XY . 
In this model, X represents the vector of economic and 
institutional variables discussed above. Table 4 presents the results of 
our statistical analysis of the determinants of the annual quantity of 
water transferred, as measured by the annual flow of water among the 
parties as stipulated by the contract. This is the standard way of 
reporting water transactions as reported in the Water Strategist.  
 
TABLE 4 
DETERMINANTS OF THE VOLUME OF WATER TRANSFERRED 
Variable Estimate Standard Chi-Square p-value
    Error   
          
Intercept -1.6270 4.4744 -0.36 0.7225
Lagged Population Change 0.8889 0.4625 1.92 0.0787
Precipitation -0.1698 0.1069 -1.59 0.1381
Dummy 1989 4.8988 2.1335 2.3 0.0405
Dummy 1991 3.4696 2.1492 1.61 0.1324
Dummy 2000 -1.0059 1.4880 -0.68 0.5119
Dummy 2003 3.4214 1.7602 1.94 0.0757
 
As shown, the coefficient signs are the same as reported for the 
analysis of water transfers, but the statistical significance has changed 
in some cases. This is not surprising because the two dependent 
variables, although similar, do differ importantly in some years.83 
Although the statistical significance for both variables has been 
reduced, we find that the population change coefficient remains 
positive and the precipitation coefficient remains negative. We also 
find that the 1989 dummy and 2003 dummy are statistically 
significant and positive. Again, the dummy for 1989 likely represents 
 
 83. See supra Figure 1. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 183 Brewer et al book pages.doc  7/29/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
212 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 26:183 
 
 
the 1988 legislation providing that decreed riparian rights may be 
transferred, and as such, it continues to have a positive effect on the 
volume of water transfers. The positive coefficient for the 2003 
dummy reflects the delayed effects of important 2002 and 2003 
legislation that strengthened water rights in California by defining 
them more clearly, including what constituted beneficial use, and 
allowing for sale or lease of conserved water. A 2003 court ruling 
also strengthened water rights.84 Although, as shown in Table 3, the 
2003 dummy is not significant with regard to the number of transfers; 
however, it does have a statistically significant effect on the volume 
traded. Accordingly, the 2003 legislative changes may have 
facilitated larger water transactions.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Scholars such as Ronald Coase, Douglass North, and Oliver 
Williamson have emphasized the importance of institutions, 
institutional change, and transaction costs in molding economic 
behavior. Legal institutions, especially as they relate to property 
rights and regulation of markets, critically influence trading activity. 
At the same time, the need to facilitate trade provides political and 
economic pressure for the modification of existing or the introduction 
of new laws and regulations to support market exchange. How 
completely the institutional environment responds will determine 
 
 84. The 2002 and 2003 legislation, enacted to facilitate the Quantified Settlement 
Agreement between the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) and San Diego Water County 
Authority (SDWCA), includes 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 617 (S.B. 482), 2003 Cal. Legis. 
Serv. Ch. 612 (S.B. 317), and Cal. Water Code § 1013. Among other things, the legislation 
insulated IID (and possibly, the San Diego County Water Authority) from liability for more 
than $133 million for impacts to the Salton Sea from the transfer. This was a critical 
development facilitating the transfer. The law strengthened IID's water rights by removing a 
large potential liability. Other California legislation is described in Sixteen Major Water Bills 
Pass in California,” Water Strategist, Oct. 2003, at 19–21.  
 For the description of a 2003 court case, see CA: El Dorado ID Receives Favorable ruling 
in Challenge to SWRCB Decision, WATER STRATEGIST, Sept. 2003, at 16–17. The ruling 
rejected SWRCB’s authority to supersede the district’s “first rights” to water. The ruling 
allowed the district to use American River water in Folsom Lake and placed water quality 
responsibilities on water export recipients. These guarantees may have made water districts 
more willing to support transfers to urban areas in Southern California. 
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how quickly and effectively market activity can respond to 
exogenous changes in prices. 
In this Article we examined the interaction between legal change 
and market activity regarding water in California in the spirit of the 
New Institutional Economics. Our approach suggests that quantifying 
otherwise qualitative measures of legal change and statistically 
analyzing their impact on observed market behavior can be a useful 
mechanism for analysis within the New Institutional Economics to 
better understand the interplay between economic factors and the law. 
With a rapidly growing population, increased demand for 
recreation and environmental quality, and a semi-arid climate, more 
and more water must be transferred from historical uses in 
agriculture, where eighty percent of it has been devoted, to urban and 
environmental uses. The development of water markets for voluntary 
exchange of water through leases of water and sales of water rights 
are an important institutional reaction. Water market institutions 
require changes in water rights and regulations to allow for increased 
water transfers from traditional uses and originating watersheds. 
These legal changes take place in legislatures, courts, and 
administrative agencies, and we have chronicled those changes from 
1980 through 2005. Many of these changes are spurred by drought, 
which often has stretched California’s already tight water supply and 
demand conditions. At the same time, the institutional structure of 
California water rights and water supply organizations determine that 
much more water trading occurs through one-year leases in the state 
than elsewhere in the West, where water rights sales and long-term 
leases are more prevalent. As climate change occurs and precipitation 
patterns become even more variable, and as California’s urban 
population continues to grow with an increased demand for 
recreation and environmental water uses, there will be additional 
pressure for legal changes on how to reallocate water in a smooth and 
cost-efficient manner. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
